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I. Technical foundation 
1. Introduction 
The recent emancipation of the nations of Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union from the rigid economic isolation accompanied by 
central planning has prompted suggestions in the West for a Marshall Plan 
II to ease the nations' transition to market economies. Implied in this 
suggestion is the belief that the original Marshall Plan, designed to aid the 
recovery of Western Europe following World War II, represented a 
successful blueprint from which to build a foreign aid package. The plan 
has been regarded by some scholars as a decisive factor In the revival of 
intra-European trade, the integration of Western Europe In a newly 
established multilateral trading system, and as the engine of growth which 
drove the eventual integration of Western Europe into a single economic 
unit. In so doing, the U.S. government wove into the plan a complex web 
of agencies, committees, politicians, and businessmen who interacted both 
In the U.S. and Western Europe to produce an intricate collaborative 
recovery effort. A modern replication of the Marshall Plan applied to the 
economies in transition obviously would be an immense undertaking, but 
is this comparison justifiable? An historical analysis of both the public and 
private sector components of the Marshall Plan and the extent to which 
they fostered economIC revival and integration within Western Europe 
during the post-war era is clearly not without pertinence in the field of 
international political economy today. 
2. 	 Theoretical framework and research methodology 
The 1980's and 1990's have witnessed both remarkable 
achievements and setbacks in the process of deepening and solidifying the 
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integration efforts of the European Economic Community that began in 
1957 with the signing of the Treaies of Rome. Developments such as the 
Single European Act, the Maastricht Treaty, and the disclosure of U.S. 
government documents after their mandatory thirty year storage in 
archives, set off a vigourous debate among historians and political 
economists, who now disagree over the extent to which American policy In 
the post-war era affected the integration process. Scholars have disputed 
the significance upon integration of public sector aid via the Marshall Plan 
and private sector involvement via American investors. This paper will 
seek first to prove, in line with historian Michael Hogan's argument, that 
there did exist American public-private sector cooperation in the post-war 
era regarding European recovery and that this cooperation was an 
international extension of corporatist ideology. However, under this 
corporatist rubric, the paper is next directed at establishing the depth of 
the relationship between the Marshall Plan and American investment and 
whether or not, taken together, they were significant factors responsible 
for bringing the goal of economic integration within Europe to fruition. 
For purposes of clarity and depth, the paper will focus on a ten year 
time frame: 1947-1957. The body of the work is divided into four major 
sections subdivided and detailed in the Table of Contents. This is an 
appropriate decade for review because it can incorporate an adequate 
analysis of the immediate effects of the Marshall Plan with periodic shifts 
and/or trends in U.S. capital investment before the Treaties of Rome. This 
paper targets capital investment because considerable emphasis has 
already been given to the surge in American foreign direct investment 
(greenfield expansion) in Western Europe during this era, but little 
attention has been given to whether or not a comparable surge existed In 
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private sector portfolio diversification. Furthermore, an analysis of 
portfolio investment and possible links to the Marshall Plan provides an 
alternative account of the degree of American influence upon the 
integration process than one which has generally been associated with 
analyses of greenfield investments. 
The analysis of these issues is conducted by drawing from a 
substantial body of literature that includes empirical evidence, first hand 
accounts of the period in review, and current historical commentary with 
specific consideration given to the Michael Hogan-Alan Milward debate 
over the utility of the Marshall Plan and their respective schools of 
thought. Unless otherwise noted, the background information pertaining to 
the period in review is considered to be a non-contentious issue. Also, the 
Marshall Plan is the unofficial name for the European Recovery Program 
(ERP) and the two terms are used interchangeably. For purposes of 
simplicity, the statistical information on recovery and investment within 
Europe pertains only to France, the United Kingdom, and West Germany.! 
Furthermore, all analysis is confined to Western Europe as this was the 
area targeted for integration after Central and Eastern European nations 
became satellites of the Soviet Union. 
As a final note, the author recognizes the immense scope of this 
Issue, and as such acknowledges that many other factors contributed to the 
realization of economic integration in Europe.2 Yet, the depth and breadth 
of scholarly debate about the Marshall Plan prevent their inclusion. 
1 Also, these nations received the majority of U.S. aid under the Marshall Plan. 
2 One of the prime motivations for Europeans to seek economic unity was the desire to 
avoid prolonged external intervention, particularly by the United States, in 
mediating conflict within Europe. By tying the n~tions of Europe together 
economically, especially Germany and France, Europeans felt that the resort to 
warfare during times of crisis would diminish and eventually disappear as an option. 
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Nevertheless, the narrow focus on the American role in recovery does not 
imply its pre-eminence as a factor behind the signing of the Treaties of 
Rome. This research, by omitting an analysis of these additional factors, In 
no way dismisses their importance, but merely attempts to illuminate a 
particular aspect of a tumultuous era in the field of international political 
economy. 
3. Definition and development of corporatist ideology 
Corporatism provides the most appropriate framework in which to 
ground this paper SInce at its core is an emphasis on how and to what 
degree the interactions between government and private sector interests 
affect both policy planning and outcomes. The application of corporatism 
to studies on the Marshall Plan is not new, but neither is it widespread. 
The most comprehensive and detailed research involving this combination 
is that of Michael Hogan, whose 1987 book The Marshall P Zan provides a 
suitable working definition. Corporatism, as used in this paper, refers to: 
"An American political economy founded on self-governing economic 
groups, integrated by institutional coordinators and normal market 
mechanisms, led by cooperating public and private elites, nourished by 
limited but positive government power, and geared to an economic growth 
in which all could share ... (this was a) brand of corporative neo-capitalism 
that went beyond the laissez-faire political economy of classical theory but 
stopped short of a statist syndicalism."3 
This American style of corporatism was embedded firmly within 
Washington's policy processes by the time the recovery plans were drafted 
and implemented. However, in a departure from Hogan's conclusion that 
the Marshall Plan was a triumph for corporatism, this paper, while 
3 Michael Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the reconstruction of 
Western Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p.3. Hereafter 
Hogan (1). 
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agreeIng that corporatist ideology is the most useful means of analyzing 
America's post-war recovery efforts regarding Europe, will challenge the 
extent to which the collaborative efforts of government and business were 
successful in nurturing private sector investment and fostering economic 
integration within Europe. 
Modern corporatism has its roots In the Hoover Administration when 
cooperation between the government and industry, organized labor, and 
interest groups became more acceptable and commonplace. During and in 
the period immediately following the Depression, the ties that Hoover had 
sought to establish with the business community were emulated by 
Roosevelt. Of notable influence was the Business Council, a large 
committee of the CEOs of America's largest corporations who frequently 
advised the secretary of commerce. Furthermore, the structure of 
Roosevelt' s New Deal presented him with the opportunity to remold the 
government-business relationship in a manner conducive to economIC 
recovery. According to John Reardon, "The Depression had profoundly 
altered the attitude of business toward the Federal government and the 
attitude of the Federal government-particularly the executive branch­
toward business. "4 The Depression can then be seen as a driving force 
behind corporative collaboration, but conditions created by World War II 
cemented the relationship. 
The need for increased industrial productivity and the accompanyIng 
need for increased natural resources during the war changed the 
government's position from one of mild verbal encouragement of foreign 
investment to one of active partnership in international operations with 
4 John J. Reardon, America and the Multinational Corporation (Westport: Praeger, 
1992), p. 35. 
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American business. Two sectors, rubber and oil, witnessed unprecedented 
government involvement in foreign operations. In the rubber industry, 
the government permitted the cartelization of American rubber companies 
in Latin America when their resources from East Asian plantations were 
seized by Japanese troops. The Roosevelt Administration became even 
more involved with American oil companies who asked that aid be secured 
for Saudi Arabia the country under the Lend-Lease program. Eventually, 
the government came to possess more direct control over the oil industry 
through its funding of the Petroleum Reserve Corporation.S By the end of 
the war, the amalgamation of government and business in the foreign 
policy sphere was complete. Consequently, this close relationship extended 
into planning for recovery in Europe. As Reardon has noted, "World War II 
had not only created, but really solidified and made viable a partnership 
between big business and the Federal government that was not going to 
dissolve when the dozens of temporary wartime agenices of industrial 
mobilization were abolished. "6 As a result of these lingering wartime 
linkages, the public-private nexus permeated all aspects of the recovery 
planning process. 
II. Manifestations of corporatism 
1. Incorporation of integration in U.S. policy 
The idea of integration in Europe was not a revolutionary concept born from 
the labor of analysts within the State Department at the close of World War II. 
Europeans themselves had considered forming a type of political or economic unio 
on previous occasions, which dated back to the early Middle Ages. But, not until 
S ibid., p. 33-34. 
6 ibid., p. 35. 
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the twentieth century did integration receIve a significant amount of support. In 
the years immediately following World War I, talk of European political solidarity 
culminated in a proposal presented by Aristide Briand to the League of Nations in 
1930 which emphasized collaboration and cooperation among European 
governments.Briand also had suggested the formation of a customs union but the 
economically tumultuous 1930's and the onset of World War II prevented further 
elaboration on this point for the time being. Nevertheless, "although Briand's 
proposal was not acted upon, the European idea lived on. "7 The fact that integratio 
"lived on" as a plausible catch-all solution to the woes of the Continent is attested 1 
by the number of influential junior members of the State Department who openly 
supported integration as essential to European post-war recovery as early as 1941 
Men such as Charles Kindleberger, Walt Rostow, and Harold Van B. Cleveland 
championed the cause in the United States. Within Europe, figures such as Jean 
Monnet, together with former Resistance leaders gave strong support to 
unificationist ideas. These men initially sparked the vision of integration as the 
panacea for war-torn Europe, but in the United States, it was also seen as the meal 
to promote American economic and security interests abroad. 
The State Department, in conjunction with the White House and the 
Treasury Department, began the process of planning for recovery in 
Europe before the United States entered the war. Eager to avoid a 
replication of a breakdown in both the international economic and political 
order that had followed World War I, recovery planners attempted to 
fashion a method of recovery that would succeed in addressing two maIn 
U.S. policy concerns: the possibility of a westward spread of Soviet 
communism and the establishment of a multilateral trading system. From 
7 Harry Bayard Price, The Marshall Plan and its Meaning (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1955), p. 346. 
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the outset, the recovery planning process was characterized less by 
altruistic tendencies toward the restoration of Europe than it was by 
American self-interest and a desire to influence the international 
institutions created at the close of the war. Luckily for the Administration, 
the sentiment was similar on Capitol Hill. "Considerable discussion took 
place in Congress on the effect that the assistance program would have on 
both the economic and the security interests of the United States. "8 When 
the planning process took on a more substantive character in the mid­
1940's, these concerns became transparent; they were the overridding 
factors in the decision to push for an integrated Europe.9 
The rapid spread of communism into CeIltral and Eastern Europe and 
the Cold War were driving forces behind U.S. policy toward Western 
Europe in the post-war era. The importance of this influence can hardly be 
overstated. As Marshall planner Joseph Jones remarked in 1955 , "No 
doubt the greatest stimulus to our policy development since 1947 has been 
the Soviet-Communist challenge." 10 Recognizing the security threat posed 
to Western Europe by both the geographical proximity of Soviet Union and 
the noticeable advancement of Communist parties within the teetering 
political systems of the continental governments, the United States moved 
with innovative rapidity to spur recovery. To America, an economically 
and politically fragmented Europe would only provide fertile soil for the 
expansion of communist ideology; economic integration within Europe 
would serve to hold communism at bay. 
8 William Adams Brown, Jr. and Redvers Opie, American Foreign Assistance 
(Menasha: George Banta Publishing Co. for the Brookings Institution, 1953), p. 15I. 

9 It is important to note that during the early stages of recovery planning, 

integration was not forcefully promoted as a main objective because Roosevelt sought 

to avoid agitating the Soviets. 

10 Joseph Jones, The Fifteen Weeks (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 

Publishers, 1955) p. 263. 
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The 'Red Scare' took on a more substantive character when Great 
Britain announced in February 1947 that it would no longer be able to 
provide aid to Greece and Turkey, two countries where support for 
communIsm was visible and where armed conflict with guerillas was a 
security threat. This perceived crisis provided an opportunity for the 
Unites States to position itself at the doorstep of Europe's affairs. When 
discussing the launch of what came to be known as the Truman Doctrine, 
Jones remarks, "he (Truman) chose the occasion of Greece to accept in the 
name of the United States the world-wide responsibilities of great 
power." 11 However, while Jones is correct in his assessment that the U.S. 
used its leverage deftly in this instance, he too readily attributes the 
decision to become involved to altruism. A more realistic appraisal of the 
situation is given by Fred Block, who argues that the political rhetoric 
embraced in the Truman Doctrine paved the way for making acceptable 
the idea of providing massive aid to Europe and tying it to an integration 
effort. Thus, the larger goal outlined by George Kennan of the containment 
of communism provided a needed rallying point to sell the integration 
idea. Yet, aside from these geopolitical concerns, the U.S. also viewed 
integration as a means of assuring greater stability in a multilateral 
trading system that lay at the heart of the post-war Bretton Woods 
negotiations. 
By 1947, the United States perceived that the current piecemeal 
assistance it provided to the countries of Europe had not yet revived its 
productive capacity. This, coupled with the agricultual shortage that was a 
result of the harsh winter of 1946-1947, gave little assurance to the 
United States that the recovery efforts thus far were producing the desired 
11 ibid., p. 12. 
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substantive results. Furthermore, Anglo-American negotiations on the 
issue of a multilateral trading order were proceeding slowly, with little 
agreement on how Europe, particularly Germany, would be reincorporated 
into the international system. Facing a situation that appeared to be 
growIng bleaker by the day and having exhausted all other policy options, 
"American leaders (gave) the idea of European unification, or at least 
economic integration, a prominent place in their policy planning ... (and) 
they turned to integration as a method of... promoting multilateralism." 12 
However, the precise means by which an integrated Europe might 
better ensure a stable multilateral system were never clearly defined by 
Marshall planners, although emphasis was placed on broadening the role of 
the private sector to generate increased economic interdependence. 
Scholars point to the increased efficency that would result from the 
revival and integration of European production and trade and the 
possibility that a coordinated continental market could better resolve its 
imbalance with the dollar trading area than could the individual countries 
of Europe)3 But, political economist John H. Williams suggests that such 
conjecture was not necessarily a call to create a 'United States of Europe.' 
He notes that the planners were well aware of the inherent flaws of such 
an analogy and that to base a recovery program upon the assumption of 
similiarity would have been damaging to Europe. Any attempt to replicate 
the U.S. domestic structure in Europe would have required both that 
Europe turn inward at a time when its dependence on outside markets 
could hardly be questioned and that it begin the process of fashioning 
12 Michael Hogan, "The Search for a Creative Peace: the United States, European 
Unity, and the Origins of the Marshall Plan." Diplomatic History (Summer 1982), p. 
268. Hereafter Hogan (2). 
13 John H. Williams, Economic Stability in a Changing World: Essays in Economic 
Theory and Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 158. 
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some type of political unIon. Because of the undesirablility of the former 
and the impracticality of the latter, the linkage between integration and 
multilateralism was made only to the extent that it focused on such 
economIC considerations as a revival of production and trade and the 
formation of a payments unIon. Whatever references made by American 
policymakers with regard to deeper forms of integration, such as political 
union, were at this time more for the sake of the rhetoric of the 
multilateral debate than were reflective of actual short-term policy 
plannning taking place in the Administration. 
It was precisely this form of rhetoric-the talk of freedom, 
democracy, and trade liberalization-that clouded over the more likely 
reasons why American aid dollars were contingent upon integration 
efforts: the containment of communism and the desire to set and 
administer the rules of a multilateral system. For U.S. policymakers, 
integration was hardly an end in itself. It "had become a way to achieve 
all other American objectives in Europe." 14 Against this backdrop, the 
Marshall Plan was created. 
2. The Marshall Plan unveiled 
The speech made by Secretary of State George C. Marshall at Harvard 
University's commencement exercises on June 5, 1947 outlining what 
would become the ERP was more the product of two months of feverish 
planning than a detailed plan of action. George Kennan of the Policy 
Planning Staff, Walt Rostow, an economist in the German-Austrian division 
of the State Department, and Joseph Jones of the Foreign Aid Committee at 
14 Hogan, qtd. in Stanley Hoffman and Charles Maier, eds., The Marshall Plan: A 
Retrospective (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), p. 6. 
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the State Department were among many who had been collaborating to 
produce an aid program designed to achieve recovery in Europe and 
address America's political and economic concerns via economic 
integration. In fact, Jones penned Dean Acheson's speech at the Delta 
Council in May 1947 which presaged the recovery program that Marshall 
would speak of at Harvard, although neither speech provided specific 
details of what such a program would entail and how much aid would be 
provided. 
Furthermore, the press had provided some indication that a recovery 
program was in the planning process. Charles Kindleberger credits Scotty 
Reston (a writer for The New York Times) with having had a hand in 
stimulating public support and interest in a recovery program. Reston 
would discuss European recovery with Acheson and draw Acheson into 
discussing plans under way in the Administration. Inevitably, a front­
page article on the subject would appear in ' The Times on the following 
day.15 Thus, there was considerable evidence both behind the closed doors 
of Washington and in the public arena that America was preparing to 
launch some form of a recovery program. Marshall simply announced 
these plans officially. He did, however, emphasize that the U.S. would be 
prepared to substantially aid Europe only if Europe would help itself by 
providing a blueprint for recovery. As Acheson had remarked earlier, the 
United States "must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in 
their own way." 16 Europe did not hesitate to respond. Within a few short 
months after Marshall's speech and after intense negotiations, the nations 
15 Charles Kindleberger, Marshall Plan Days (Boston: Allen and Unwin, Inc., 1987), 
pp. 27-28. 

16 Acheson, qtd. in Scott Jackson, "Prologue to the Marshall Plan: The Origins of the 

American commitment for a European Recovery Program." The Journal of American 





of Europe had formed their first regional institution: the Committee for 
European Economic Cooperation (CEEC) and had submitted a recovery 
proposal to Washington. 
The speed with which Europe organized the CEEC has recently led 
scholars to infer that Marshall and the Congress forced Europe into 
planning unwillingly for economic integration by the threat of withholding 
or not providing aid at all. These intimations are dubious at best. By this 
point, Europeans themselves had realized the possible strength that could 
lay in self-determined unity. As Harry Price remarks, 
"In Europe there was a gradual increase in understanding of the 
necessity-with or without American aid-for association to build up 
common efforts toward economic welfare and toward political development 
through whatever manifestations they might come to take." 1 7 
From both sides of the Atlantic, there appeared to be consensus that 
substantive changes in the European economic structure would be a 
necessary component of any recovery program. What exactly those 
changes would consist of and the extent to which they would be influenced 
by American planners had yet to manifest themselves. 
One change that was certain to take place with the implementation of 
the ERP was the division of the continent into rival blocs. Initially, U.S. 
policymakers offered to include the Soviet Union and the nations of 
Eastern Europe in the post-war aid program, but aware that the Soviet 
Union would never endorse the proposition. Such a position entailed a 
dual advantage. If the countries accepted the aid and the conditions linked 
to it, a stronger foothold for U.S. influence in the region would be 
imminent. Or, if officials in Moscow refused to allow the satellites to accept 
the aid, then the refusal would be seen as a rebuff to the goodwill of the 
17 Price, p. 347-348. 
14 
Washington. The Administration then would have established ample 
justification in the eyes of the international community for implementing 
its agenda regarding the restoration of Western Europe. If Europe were to 
be divided, it would be seen as an unfortunate consequence caused by the 
failure of the Soviet Union to cooperate. This decision to extend aid to the 
eastern part of the continent was a strategic diplomatic move. 
Consequently, when Stalin recalled his foreign secretary V.M. Molotov from 
the Paris Conference in July 1947 convened to discuss possible responses 
to the aid offer, the division of Europe was a foregone conclusion. 
After the conference, the immediate task that lay before the Truman 
Administration was to find a way to consolidate the requests for aid that 
Marshall had solicited from the Europeans into a package that it could sell 
to a cautious, Republican-dominated Congress. The Administration called 
upon three appointed committees and standing committees within the 
various departments to study different plans for recovery and to engage In 
cost-benefit analyses. Additionally, the private sector was solicited for 
advice and was instrumental in shaping policy. Secretary of Commerce W. 
A verell Harriman headed the Committee on Foreign Aid composed of 
businessmen charged with the responsibility of determining America's 
ability to undertake such a massive aid effort. During these initial stages, 
there could have been little doubt that the private sector would figure 
prominently in any aid plan that the Congress would approve. 
All in all, $29 billion had been requested by the CEEC, a sum which 
was not even in the realm of congressional consideration. In order to 
convince Congress of the necessity of such an expensive plan, the 'United 
States of Europe' rhetoric was used as a goading device. The plan was sold 
as a means to "refashion Western Europe in the image of the United 
1 5 

States" 18 even though the Administration's inner circle knew of the distant 
likelihood that Europe would accept that imposition as a condition for aid. 
But Truman's men were not alone in the negotiations with Congress. The 
business community also was influential in persuading Capitol Hill to pass 
the aid package. Groups such as the American Association of 
Manufacturers and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce exerted considerable 
pressure on Congress that was keenly felt in both chambers. What 
emerged from Congress in the spring of 1948 was the Foreign Assistance 
Act, Title I of which was the Economic Cooperation Act that provided the 
ERP $5 billion in the first twelve months of its existence.19 Originally, the 
ERP was to last until 1952, with an aid evaluation and congressional 
renewal in each year in between. This represented the bare bones of the 
plan; a plan characterized by corporatism and a focus on economic 
integration. 
If the ERP's integrative efforts were the means to recovery, and 
recovery was the means to a unified Europe that was a stable participant 
In a multilateral system, the assistance provided by the Marshall Plan had 
to be targeted toward specific areas that were crucial to the recovery 
process. Marshall planners cited the need for a payments union and both 
technical and managerial assistance aimed at the revival and increased 
efficiency of production and the restoration of intra-European trade. 
Monetary aid alone, regardless of its amount, would have been insufficient 
to address adequately these concerns. Williams wisely noted at the time 
that "American dollars should not be the main reliance. "20 Aware of this 
possible pitfall, Marshall planners sought to supplement the aid by 
18 Hogan 0), p. 89. 
19 op. cit. 
20 Williams, p. 86. 
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encouraging the active participation of the American private sector in 
recovery by including businessmen In the oversight of the program and 
encouraging investment in Europe. In fact, the Economic Cooperation Act 
required that investment be targeted and it provided guaranty funds as an 
enticement to investors. Marshall planners had recognized that the 
amount of official aid provided would be insufficient to accommodate 
Europe's needs, so they stressed the need for private sector input. If the 
plan was to be judged a success in the manner that the planners had hoped 
for, then collaboration was viewed as a sine qua non for stimulating the 
needed additional investment. For this reason, the private sector was 
welcomed into the corporatist fold which came to characterize the ERP. 
3. Public-private sector collaboration in the recovery effort 
Although planning for recovery began before the war had ended, In 
its early stages, the process was not definitively corporatist. The attention 
later given to the importance of private investment was not initially 
substantial. Nevertheless, the private sector was determined early on to 
keep its hand in the game. In 1942, the prestigious Committee for 
Economic Development (CED) was formed by leading executives and 
academics to address issues pertinent to a recovery effort. When Marshall 
extended the offer of aid to Europe, the CED had firmly entrenched itself in 
the recovery process. In fact, one of the founders of the CED, Paul 
Hoffman, was selected to head the Economic Cooperation Administration 
(ECA) charged with implementation of the ERP. It was through the ECA 
that private interests were included in the drive to integrate Europe. 
From the outset, the ECA was meant to be a corporatist alliance with 
a somewhat heavier tilt toward the role of the private sector. When 
17 
Congress was In the process of determining exactly how the ERP would be 
administered, the Brookings Institution (an independent Washington think 
tank), at the request of Senator Arthur Vandenberg, issued a report calling 
for an independent agency which would report directly to the President 
and would be composed of men from the private sector. Vandenberg was 
heavily influenced by the report and endorsed the recommendations of the 
Brookings Institution on Capitol Hill. This resulted in the corporative 
structure of the ECA. In assessing the congressional mandate which 
officially created the ECA, Immanuel Wexler remarks that "in the final 
analysis, the administrative organization of the aid program was as much a 
product of nongovernmental contributions as were some of its essential 
elements. "21 
These "nongovernmental contributions" encompassed by the ECA 
included: the Public Advisory Board (PAB), numerous committees staffed 
by individuals from the private sector, and industry-specific divisions. 
Representatives from organized business, labor, and agriculture were 
appointed to the P AB by Hoffman and the committees were staffed by 
businessmen with extensive backgrounds in finance, law, and corporate 
governance. Men were recruited from General Motors, Standard Oil, Inland 
Steel, Detroit-Edison, and Merck and Company to head the industrial 
divisions based in the United States and to aid in the implementation of 
the ECA's missions abroad.22 And, aside from these representatives of big 
business, the ECA was successful in obtaining the cooperation of American 
trade unions. According to Hoffman, "The trade unions of America (had) a 
21 Immanuel Wexler, The Marshall Plan Revisited (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1983), 
p. 31. 
22 Michael Hogan, "American Marshall Planners and the Search for a European 
Neocapitalism." American Historical Review (1985), p. 58-60. Hereafter Hogan (3). 
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status of full partnership in the ECA not only from the standpoint of 
operations but from the standpoint of making policy. "23 Quite obviously, 
Hoffman had established himself as an ardent supporter of bipartisan, 
arguably nonpartisan, corporatist collaboration and was determined to 
have the ECA reflect that position. That the ECA's structure, procedures, 
and resulting policies were impacted significantly by such corporatism 
within the United States is hardly questionable; this is a strong and 
supportable argument offered by Hogan. However, the extent to which 
this tight collaboration, in its American form, was replicated in Europe is 
slightly more tenuous. 
The ECA did succeed in providing an organizational framework for 
the continental participants in the ERP in which corporatism was a core 
element. It channeled efforts to establish a network of European business, 
interest, and trade groups that were linked directly to the OEEC and the 
ERP through advisory committees. But the most visible linkages that the 
ECA forged or supported were not those aimed at collaboration among the 
Europeans involved in the recovery program, but a trans-Atlantic linkage 
whereby the ECA would organize various American groups who were to 
ally themselves with particular interests in Europe. The ECA sponsored a 
technical assistance program that began in 1948 and was responsible for 
sending American managers, corporate executives, and academics to 
Europe to offer advice and assistance to their European counterparts. 
Hogan, exhibiting strains of paternalism, refers to them as "roving 
23 Hoffman, qtd. in Hogan (3), p. 61. Whether or not the trade unions agreed with 
this lofty appraisal of their status in the ECA is the subject of another debate outside 
the scope of this paper, but nevertheless significant. 
19 
ambassadors"24 while overlooking a less prosaIc but more likely 
description. 
Those Americans dispatched by the ECA under the technical 
assistance program were not goodwill volunteers as much as they were 
recruits sent to ensure that American aid dollars were spent the American 
way. Also, it is plausible to view them as a means to assuage the concerns 
of private investors who were unsure of the Europeans' ability to maintain 
stability and to provide a less risky atmosphere for the efficient and 
profitable transfer of capital. The ECA, albeit a supposed independent 
body, was no less interested in promoting rapid economic integration, 
stimulating investment and contributing to the achievement of America's 
overall goals of political security and multilateralism than was the 
Administration or Congress. Since the ECA reported directly to the 
President and operated with congressional funding provided under the 
ERP, it would be naive to assume that the ECA conducted its business in a 
vacuum, neither mindful of nor influenced by either branch's agenda. 
Thus, although the ECA had the responsibility of managing the 
practical aspects of the recovery program, it did so with an eye toward 
promoting private American interests in Europe in a way that would be 
beneficial to both the investors and to the integration process. A 
noteworthy example was the support given by the ECA to the efforts of the 
Aldrich committee in matching up three American investment groups with 
similar groups in Belgium, France, and Britain whose purpose was to 
suggest development projects for American investors.25 Yet, once again, 
Marshall planners shied away from a detailed plan of action and declined 
24 ibid., p. 62. 
25 Hogan (3), p. 60. 
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to set a numerical target that specified by what amount they had hoped to 
increase the flow of private investment to Europe. In fact, they never 
clearly defined what type of investment was sought. They were guided by 
a "broad interpretation" of investment that included: 
"contributions of capital goods, materials, equipment, services, patents, 
processes, and tehniques in the form of loans; the purchase of a share of 
ownership in a foreign enterprise; and the participation in royalties, 
earnings, or profits. ,,2 6 
Given this vague framework, for purposes of clarity and simplicity, this 
paper will define private investment in terms of loanable capital. The 
emphasis the planners placed on achieving integration, the depth of 
collaboration in all major aspects of the recovery program, and the 
perceived dependence on private investment were all significant aspects of 
post-war corporatism; whether or not this corporatism which characterized 
the Marshall Plan was directly responsible for triggering increased 
portfolio investment in Europe is now the focus. 
III. U.S. investment in Europe 
1. The investment climate: prospects, flashbacks, and 
incentives 
At the end of the war, the overall flow of American capital into 
western Europe was not significant. Capital investment was on the decline 
in 1947 when only ten American corporations were responsible for 75% of 
investment outflow. 27 Milward attributes this hesitancy among Americans 
to invest to wariness over either the "security or profitability" that such 
investments could offer, although he disputes the existence of any "crisis" 
26 Brown, p. 172. 

27 Alan Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-51 (London: Routledge, 

1984), p. 48. Hereafter Milward (1). 
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during 1947 that would have either made increased investment unlikely 
or the Marshall Plan necessary. In analyzing the post-war climate of 
Europe, he asserts, "All that was immediately at stake was a malfunction of 
international trade and payments ... "28 Surely such a situation would be 
enough to make any potential investor wary! Even though European 
productivity had begun to recover and grow by 1947, the depth of the 
wartime destruction of Europe's political, capital, and physical 
infrastructures did not present potential investors with a favorable 
atmosphere for investment. 29 Williams concured with this assessment 
when he wrote at the close of the war, "Europe really is not a fit place now 
for investment, conditions being what they are. "30 Also, new challenges 
were arising as a result of the Cold War. 
In mid-1948, responding to support among the former Allies for a 
democratic West German government, Soviet troops denied all overland 
access to Berlin. When the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was 
formed a year later, a total blockade of Berlin was instituted. The rapidity 
with which the postwar world divided into competing ideological blocs 
painted a rather bleak picture for investment. In analyzing these events, 
Reardon remarks that "the postwar world was not a particularly friendly 
place for. . .investment. "31 Finding mechanisms for stimulating investment 
in this type of environment was not an easy task for the ECA, but in 
addition to the obstacles presented by a lack of infrastructure and the Cold 
28 ibid., p. 55. 
29 For a detailed summary of the specific conditions afflicting Western Europe at the 
close of the war, refer to: J. Bradford De Long and Barry Eichengreen, "The Marshall 
Plan: History's Most Successful Structural Adjustment Program." CEPR Discussion 
Paper No. 634 (May 1992), pp. 12-16. 
30 Williams, p. 267 
31 Reardon, p. 43. 
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War, the ECA had to overcome painful memories among investors of the 
losses they incurred during the interwar era. 
The 1920's were characterized by a growing U.S. economy with a rise 
In domestic savings that contributed to a willingness among individuals 
and corporations to supply Europe with needed capital in what Williams 
has termed "the big decade of American private international 
investment. "32 Investors were more than eager to provide loans for 
reconstruction, as evidenced by the approximately $1 billion that was 
invested abroad, mainly in Europe.33 Such activity was endorsed 
throughout the twenties by the U.S. government which recognized how its 
role in credit provision could be narrowed if the private role of providing 
needed capital was widened. Accordingly, the government specifically 
refrained from restricting capital outflow. The passage of the Federal 
Reserve Act also aided this goal; regulations governing the operations of 
foreign bank branches were relaxed. Furthermore, the government 
supplied Europe, particularly loans to Germany for reparations payments, 
with credit substantive enough to have enticed investors into hedging their 
bets on what appeared to be a relatively stable environment in which to 
extend private loans. When the U.S. abruptly cut this line of credit in 
1928-29, the instability previously masked was revealed as many of the 
investments formerly encouraged had been converted into gaping losses. 
Eichengreen estimates that three-fourths of all foreign securities that U.S. 
investors purchased in the twenties were in default by the end of the 
1930s)4 The severity of the blow felt by investors leads Williams to 
32 Williams, p. 76. 

33 De Long, p. 15. 

34 Barry Eichengreen, "The U.S. Capital Market and Foreign Lending, 1920-1955." in 

Jeffrey Sachs, ed. Developing Country Debt and the World Economy (Chicago: 

University of Chicago Press, 1989), p. 242. 
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conclude that the government "went too far after the first World War by 
encouraging private investment in Europe. "35 However, to place the blame 
on the government for failed investments ignores the equally important 
factor of immense miscalculations on the part of the private sector itself. 
Still, the memory of the losses incurred and the government's adjunct role 
was one fresh in investors' minds twenty years later and proved a 
formidable barrier for the ECA to overcome. 
One of the methods that the government used to entice investors 
back to · Europe was the guaranty funds provided in the Economic 
Cooperation Act. Hoffman was given authorization to extend up to $300 
million to back private investments, which was not a particularly high 
amount, but was significant enough to highlight the government's intention 
to support private investors. The Act also specified that the Europeans 
themselves ought to back U.S. investors. Under these European-based 
guarantees, authorization was further extended to include coverage for 
profits as well as initial investment costs. American businessmen, 
however, were not quick to take advantage of the funds. At the end of 
1949, only $3.9 million in investments was guaranteed, and of that $3.5 
million was in the United Kingdom.36 This sum was meager compared to 
the amount that was provided for, but it was still early on in the recovery 
process. Given the hesitancy still felt by investors, any expectations of 
maSSIve capital outflow, regardless of guarantees, were both unrealistic 
and excessively optimistic. Yet, in order to promote the corporative 
framework and to convince Vandenberg and his colleagues that a serious 
effort was being made to shift part of the burden for recovery from the 
35 Williams, p. 267. 
36 Milward (1), p. 120. 
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public coffers to the private pockets, the funds were a necessary initiative 
on the part of the ECA. The funds, though, were not the only means by 
which planners attempted to stimulate investment. 
There had been a growing sense of frustration in the Congress over 
this failure to stimulate investment that matched the aid set aside for that 
purpose. Public pressure mounted with each consecutive year that 
funding for the ERP had to be renewed while a greater degree of private 
sector involvement had not been achieved. An option which would not 
require additional appropriations was sought. By 1950, the Administration 
had presented Congress with a request to liberalize the tax laws on foreign 
investment (both direct and portfolio) as another incentive. But by 1951, 
this risk-underwriting by the government did not produce levels of 
investment that the guaranty funds supplemented by tax law revisions 
could have covered. This should not lead to the assumption that increased 
U.S. investment in Europe was not taking place, but merely illustrates that 
it was not taking place to a significant degree by investors taking 
advantage of the guaranty funds. Judgment on this matter must be 
reserved following a more detailed analysis of investment flows. 
2. Economic and political arguments for increased investment 
Marshall planners had pinned their hopes on investment as an 
additional boon to integration for both economic and political reasons. In 
the first respect, capital investment was recognized as a key component of 
sustained economic growth that would supplement and enhance efforts 
underway to revitalize intra-European trade, improve Europe's balance of 
payments position, and draw Europe into a multilateral trading system. 
The strength of this argument linking investment and growth had been 
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acknowledged and supported by economic theorists with increased 
attention given to studies on the business cycle that emerged during the 
plan years.37 Investment patterns in the short run were seen as 
determinants of growth trends in the long run and as crucial to the 
reconstruction of the European economy. The consistency and 
sustainability of any increased investment was dependent upon four 
variables: derived demand for capital goods, profit incentive and 
expectation, money market conditions (including interest rates and 
monetary liquidity), and government policies of subsidization and 
taxation.38 Another concern, reflected in the establishment of the EPU In 
1950, was Europe's balance of payments position. It was recognized that 
unless this problem was rectified, Europe's money market would remain 
distorted, which would deter the flow of loanable capital from potential 
American investors Marshall planners, through devices such as the 
assistance program, guaranty funds, and tax law revisions, attempted to 
manipulate those variables and market conditions in an effort to . create an 
atmosphere conducive to investment. Yet these theoretical underpinnings 
were only half of the rationale for the encouragement of investment. The 
political rationale underlying this focus on investment was equally 
important. 
The oft-repeated remark that Marshall planners were striving to 
'make the world safe for American capitalism' is not far from the truth, 
given the political climate in which they operated. In order to resell the 
37 In his United Nations report Growth and Stagnation in the European Economy, 
Geneva, 1954, Ingvar Svennilson provides a detailed synthesis of current research in 
business cycle theory that draws heavily from R.R. Harrod's Towards a Dynamic 
Economics, London, 1948 and J.R. Hicks' A Contribution to the Theory of the Trade 
Cycle, Oxford, 1950. 
38 Svennilson, pp. 6-7. 
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plan on Capitol Hill each succeSSIve congressional year and to assure 
taxpayers that ERP aid would be a benefit, rather than a detriment, to a 
booming post-war domestic economy, planners also had to incorporate a 
vision of how the private sector could profit from the assistance program. 
They described investment as not only a means by which integration could 
be encouraged, but also as a means for American business to exert greater 
influence in a multilateral system. Seen in this light, corporative 
collaboration in this era did not occur solely to put Europe back on its feet; 
corporatism occurred because it was politically necessary. Marshall 
planners thus were faced with a dilemma: on the one hand, the situation 
in Europe had to be presented to Congress as so serious that the need for 
f 
aid was unquestionable. Yet on the other, they had to reassure investors 
that their money was relatively safe in the European market. With the 
experiences of the interwar era, this was indeed an arduous task. But, the 
significant differences between the post WWI recovery and conditions In 
1947-8 reveal that perhaps the picture of Europe painted by the 
Administration was not entirely accurate. 
By all accounts, the recovery in Europe after World War II was faster 
than it had been following the first World War. De Long and Eichengreen 
compare recovery levels after both wars in terms of a per capita GDP 
average of Britain, France, and Germany (West after WWII) and estimate 
that the degree of recovery achieved by Europe in the sixteen years 
immediately following WWI was replicated after WWII in only six years, 
and half of that had been achieved by 1949,39 They also compare the 
recovery of Western European coal, steel, and cement production for both 
periods and note that in all three sectors, production rates had been 
39 De Long, p. 17. 
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steadily rIsIng between 1947-1949 and had increased dramatically 
following 1949, leading them to conclude that recovery was much more 
rapid the second time around. Furthermore, dollar imports to western 
Europe for capital goods rose between 1946 and 1947; this evidence lends 
credence to Milward's argument that when the ERP came into effect in 
1948, it did more to sustain a production boom already under way than to 
cause one to occur.40 Nevertheless, it must not be forgotten that despite 
such promising figures, Europe was still struggling with a severe balance of 
payments crisis due in large part to a dollar shortage and the effects of the 
ERP ought not yet to be minimized without an adequate analysis of 
additional statistics relating to European recovery and growth and U.S. 
investment in Europe during the decade in question. 
3. Statistical evidence-See Appendix for tables 
Table I: Gross National Product and Capital Formation (GNP and CF) 
Table II: Total U.S. Foreign Lending 
Table III: Value of U.S. Direct Investment by Area 
Table IV: Deposits in Savings Banks 
4. Analysis of statistical data 
First, it is necessary to evaluate the process of recovery and growth 
In Western Europe in the immediate post-war era from the data in Table I 
before a comparison can be made to investment levels. A cursory glance 
at the national account data reveals that in France, West Germany and the 
United Kingdom, GNP rose steadily each consecutive year in the decade 
following the war, except for a brief dip in France's GNP between 1947-48. 
40 Alan Milward, "Was the Marshall Plan Necessary?" Diplomatic History (1989), p. 
238. Hereafter Milward (2). 
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During the last three years of actual aid transfers by the ERP,41 France's 
GNP rose by 109%, the United Kingdom's by 102%, and West Germany's by 
120%.42 It is not suprising that West Germany posted higher growth rates 
in GNP than the other two since large amounts of Marshall Plan aid had 
been targeted specifically to the revival of its coal production which had 
been decimated during the war. Milward notes that during this period, 
"the increase in output in West Germany continued unabated" although 
overall coal production in Europe was still below plan targets.43 It is also 
important to note that during the ERP years, there does not exist a drastic 
upward shift in any of the three countries' GNPs. The climb each year was 
significant and relatively smooth. Furthermore, the termination of 
Marshall aid in 1952 does not appear to have had a negative effect on GNP; 
figures continued to rise steadily between 1953 and 1957. In these five 
years, French GNP rose by 122%, British by 111 %, and German by 135%. 
Combining these two stages (1950-1957) gives the following overall 
Increases in GNP: France, 137%; United Kingdom., 123%; and Germany, 
174%. 
A reVIew of the figures for growth in capital formation reveals 
results similar to the rising trend noted for GNP growth. As before, a 
comparison of the three countries will begin with 1950 due to the absence 
of data for France and Germany in the three years prior and due to the fact 
that a large proportion of Marshall funds prior to 1950 were used for food 
purchases rather than capital formation, especially in the United 
41 It is difficult to compare all three countries until 1950 since data for West 

Germany is not available on GNP for the first two years of the ERP. 

42 All percentage changes were calculated by dividing the figures n + (1 ... 7­
depending on the years of comparison) years by base year n and multiplying by 100. 

For example, France's GNP growth of 109% during 1950-52: 202.1/184.9 = 1.09 x 100 = 

109%. 
43 Milward (1), p. 410. 
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Kingdom.44 Overall capital formation was high during the post-war decade 
throughout all of Europe. For the entire period 1950-57, CF levels rose 
each consecutive year for both the United Kingdom and Germany. France's 
CF levels rose overall, but dropped during the last two years of the ERP 
before picking up again in 1954. 
During the remaining ERP years, British CF levels moved upward, 
adding a total of only £21 million over those three years. Similarly, 
Germany had rising CF levels at this time, but like the United Kingdom, the 
actual increased value was relatively small: 3.6 million deutschmarks. For 
France, 1950-52 was a period of decline in CF as it posted two consecutive 
declines totaling one million francs. In the following year, CF declined by 
another 2 million francs before rebounding again in 1954. The figures for 
France are peculiar in that they present a paradox: France spent more of 
its ERP counterpart funds on capital investment than any other European 
country and half of all counterpart funding under the ERP was spent in 
France. Yet, it is the one country whose CF levels decline over the course 
of the ERP. A rather sketchy, but perhaps only acceptable explanation is 
that the funding for capital investment from ERP funds remained the same 
in France while funding from the French government and private capital 
market declined to a degree greater than the amount of the aid funds. 
This could have easily been the case considering that investments targeted 
under France's Modernization Plan created conflict between the private 
capital market which could not service all of the demand and public banks 
which were unwilling to underwrite many of the investment projects.45 
Moreover, the French figures illuminate why the entire analysis of capital 
44 ibid., p. 104. 
45 ibid., p. 109. 
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formation throughout Europe and its relationship to ERP aid IS a 
contentious one. Milward explains: 
"What proportion of Marshall Aid funds did actually contribute to capital 
formation cannot be determined, because all of them could theoretically 
have had the effect, no matter how it was deployed within the economy, of 
releasing other funds for investment. "4 6 
In any case, a more detailed analysis of these figures is beyond the scope 
of this paper, but having established that a steady growth in GNP and 
capital formation occured over the years before, after and during the ERP, 
it is safe to concur with Milward's analysis that the dollar aid provided 
under the Marshall Plan supplemented, but did not necessarily create an 
upward recovery trend. 
Dissecting the data on investment from Table II presents the same 
problem. Eichengreen's data are all-inclusive and non Euro-specific as he 
addresses the difficulties in conducting his analysis, "consistent country 
data on the extent of total foreign borrowing after World War II are 
notoriously difficult to obtain. "47 Thus, although it is known that private 
investors used only 1.3% of the guaranty funds by 1951 for investment in 
Europe, trying to attribute that investment to specific Marshall plan dollars 
is much like searching for a needle in a haystack. Nevertheless, 
Eichengreen's data does provide significant insight into post-war 
investment trends that can be analyzed against the recovery figures. 
Direct long-term lending (DLT) by U.S. investors declined from 1947­
1955, with a sharp decline of 57% between the plan yearsl947-51. At the 
end of 1952, which corresponded with the end of Marshall aid to Western 
Europe, that percentage decline had been fully restored before falling 
46 ibid., p. 107 
47 Eichengreen, p. 243. 
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agaIn In both 1953 and 1954, suggesting that no link, or a very weak one 
at best, was created between the Marshall Plan and private investment. 
At the end of 1955, DLT rose again, but not by enough to restore it to 
immediate post-war levels. It settled at only 95% of what it had been In 
1947. Unlike DLT, which was characterized by a semi-smooth trend of 
falling investment, other long-term lending (OL T) by private investors 
initially rose swiftly and sharply, posting a 938% increase between 1947­
1950. Yet, by the end of 1953, OLT had plummeted, only to again rise 
dramatically in 1954 and 1955. Overall, OLT increased by 425% in the 
post-war decade. Short-term lending (SLT) followed a rollercoaster-like 
path, a path which reflects the inability of ERP funding to stabilize 
consistent upward growth in this sector. It dropped almost 200% between 
1947-49 then rose 130% in 1950. SLT dropped slightly between 1951-52 
before sinking again in 1953. The next year witnessed a remarkable 
increase of 477.5% in SLT which was quickly offset in 1955 by a 334% 
decrease. Throughout all of these rapid shifts, however, SL T in 1955 
measured a modest 88% of 1947 levels. Finally, private unilateral 
transfers dropped during most of the ERP years, rising only between 1951­
52 and 1952-53 before dropping again and leveling off at 58% of 1947 
levels. The inference drawn here, even allowing for the increase in OL T, is 
that certain divisions of private American investment during this decade 
were depressed to a degree, but not altogether invisible. Eichengreen 
attributes this decline to the effect that inter-war defaults had on U.S. 
investors rather than on particular post-war conditions abroad.48 
However, data from Mitchell in Table III suggest that post-war conditions 
In Europe did contribute to wariness among U.S. investors. The comparison 
48 ibid., p. 246. 
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In Table III of investment in Canada, Latin America, and Western Europe 
reals that although U.S. investment was increasing slowly in Europe, the 
majority of funds flowing out of the United States were being invested 
elsewhere during the post-war decade. Between 1950 and 1957, U.S. 
investments in Canada and Latin America were relatively on par with one 
another and each were double the amount of the funds being channeled to 
Europe. Thus, although Mitchell corroborates Eichengreen's conclusion that 
substantial flows of private capital to Europe did not exist at this time, his 
data refutes Eichengreen's contention that investors were too nervous to 
invest anywhere and suggests that they may have been acutely affected 
by conditions particular to Europe. 
A conclusion of this rudimentary analysis suggests that there does 
not exist a causal relationship between U.S. private investment and the 
remarkable recovery of France, the United Kingdom, and Germany. An 
interesting correlation, however, does exist between these recovery levels 
and domestic savings in these countries. A brief look at the savings data 
for France and Germany reveals that in each country, deposits in savIngs 
banks rose each consecutive year without falling once, increasing over the 
decade by 678% and 1768%, respectively! In the United Kingdom, deposits 
in trustee savings banks rose each year while deposits in Post Office 
Savings banks (POS) steadily declined, although not to a large degree. 
Deposits in the trustee accounts rose by 156% and the POS deposits In 1957 
stood at 86% of 1947 levels. Given the basic correlation that exists 
between domestic savings rates and sustained economic growth,49 it is not 
implausible to conclude that savings, viewed against what U.S. private 
investment did exist, may have made a more direct contribution to the 
49 For elaboration, see Svennilson. 
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recovery process In Western Europe than did the products of U.S. 
corporatism. Furthermore, the vagueness which characterized the 
Marshall planners overall goal of increased investment makes it even more 
difficult to arrive at a benchmark for determining a specific numerical link 
between dollars from the ERP and dollars from the private sector. 
However, it is reasonable to infer from the foregoing analysis that a high, 
or even steadily climbing, rate of overall U.S. private investment was 
largely absent during and immediately after the plan years. Even so, 
drawing on their own resources, official dollar aid and other aspects of the 
Marshall Plan, Europeans did not deviate far from the path to economic 
in te gration. 
IV. The Road to Rome 
1. European efforts toward economic integration 
Although the Marshall Plan's corporative structure provided an 
additional impetus, both economic and political, to the push toward 
economIC integration on the Continent, Europeans were clearly determined 
to set their own agenda on this Issue. Three significant developments took 
place within western Europe In the post-war decades that were harbingers 
of the Common Market. 
First, the establishment of a customs union received serious attention 
at the conclusion of the war, but "this was, in a sense, only a continuation 
of the discussion at the point where it had been broken off in the 
'thirties. "50 The Benelux countries (Belgium, Netherlands, and 
Luxembourg) made significant headway in this area absent of American 
50 United Nations, Economic Survey of Europe Since the War, Geneva (February, 
1953), p. 224. 
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support as their efforts to "come together in a close economic unIon, 
without trade barriers and with free movements of labour and capital, 
goes back to 1943,"51 years before the words 'Marshall Plan' had been 
spoken on the lips of anyone in Washington. By 1948, customs duties 
among the three had been abolished and a common tariff was erected, 
although the effective implementation of these measures was not felt 
immediately. Next, in 1949, all quantitative restrictions had been removed 
and by 1952, the United Nations observed that "the establishment of the 
Benelux union has, so far, been accompanied by some increase in the 
relative importance of each partner in the trade of the other country. "52 
Thus, the decision to create a customs union for all of Western Europe was 
not without a guiding precedent. 
Second, the establishment in 1950 of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) was another crucial forerunner of the Common Market 
that was achieved largely indepedent of direct American persuasion, 
economIC or political. Obviously, Marshall Planners exerted influence upon 
the formation process of the ECSC, but it was still a distinctively European 
institution. European politicians recognized that an indefinite presence of 
an international Ruhr authority would not be preferable and that 
Europeans themselves needed to find a solution which would insure long­
term stability in the region. This meant that the possibility of another war 
between Germany and France had to be rendered, "not merely 
unthinkable, but materially impossible. "53 Under Schuman's proposal, the 
resources and productive capabilities in coal and steel of France, Germany, 
51 ibid., p. 225. 
52 53 op. cit. 

53 Robert Schuman, French Foreign Minister, qtd. in John Pinder, European 
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Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg were consolidated under 
a common authority-the ECSC. 
The third distinctly European effort toward integration occurred at 
the 1955 Messina Conference in Sicily where the six foreign ministers of 
the ECSC met to consider the recommendations to found "a common 
organization to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and the 
initiation of a common European market, free from all customs duties and 
all quantitative restrictions. "54 Messina was the last conference that 
Monnet attended in his capacity as president of the ECSC's High Authority. 
Monnet then founded the 'Action Committee for the United States of 
Europe' whose purpose was to contribute to a more substantial effort 
toward integration, which he thought was lacking at Messina. The 
committee, composed of European politicians directly courted by Monnet, 
first convened on January 18, 1956 and reaffirmed the decision to create a 
supranational nuclear energy authority by asking its members to present 
the recommendation to their respective national parliaments. Within five 
months, the six foreign ministers had given consideration to the Action 
Committee's proposals, and on May 29-30, they voted to support both an 
energy union and a Common Market. 
These steps led to the passage of the Treaties of Rome, which officially 
created Euratom and the European Economic Community (EEC), on March 
25, 1957. On January 1, 1958 the treaties came into effect and the largest 
major step toward European economic integration had been realized. 
2. Concluding remarks 
54 Hans A. Schmitt, The Path to European Union: From the Marshall Plan to the 
Common Market (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962), p.232. 
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The question posed in the title of this paper does not lend itself to a 
simple resolution. But having considered the analysis within the confines 
of this study, the answer must be a qualified no for two reasons: first, as 
was just discussed, it is highly likely that some form of economic 
integration would have evolved as a result of intra-European initiative 
with or without assistance as far-reaching as the Marshall Plan and second, 
steadily increasing U.S. private investment during and immediately after 
the plan years was not established. 
The lack of a causal relationship between Marshall Plan dollars and 
private investment negates the concept of the two being dependent upon 
one another for their success in the post-war era. The evidence is 
unmistakably clear that ERP aid did little to instill confidence within the 
minds, and more importantly, the pockets, of private investors. The 
absence of any credible contrary data further diminishes the importance of 
U.S. portfolio investment as a factor in European economic integration. 
However, although the two factors taken together and portfolio investment 
considered on its own merit did not substantially contribute to the 
integration process, the Marshall Plan taken by itself appears to have had 
important ramifications in this regard. 
The Marshall Plan was a remarkable corporative achievement that 
succeeded in laying a stable foundation for the eventual economic 
integration of Europe, although it did not do so by dramatically affecting 
the flow of private dollars onto the continent. It did not need to. Private 
investment was not a necessary condition for the Marshall Plan to be 
judged as a success, nor was the plan dependent on that investment to 
promote integration. Economic integration evolved despite the immediate 
absence of investment in the post-war era. But, investment aside, there 
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did exist substantive achievements of the ERP which supplemented and 
enhanced the efforts made within Europe. 
Planners at the ECA, appointees within the Administration, officials 
within the State Department, and citizens from the private sector 
rigorously encouraged the development of corporative collaboration In 
Europe, even if it was being achieved in a manner distinct from the style 
which had evolved in the United States. They encouraged the 
development of European corporatism through the linkages it established 
with groups such as the OEEC. The ECA provided technical and managerial 
assistance, coordinated plans for investment (even though the dollars were 
slow to follow), and continuously monitored progress toward integration. 
This conclusion simultaneously vindicates the arguments of both the Hogan 
and Milward, while recognizing the limitations of each. Hogan is correct to 
assess the recovery decade as one characterized by a corporative structure 
throughout both the political and economic aspects of the ERP, but the 
emphasis he places on the necessity of the mutual participation of both the 
American public and private sectors in the recreation of Europe's 
economies is exaggerated. Milward has illuminated and refuted several 
misconceptions about the depth of economic devastation in Europe at the 
end of the war. He is correct in suggesting that the recovery process was 
well under way prior to the establishment of the ERP. Yet, he exaggerates 
his argument as well, taking it to the other extreme-Europe would have 
recovered without the Marshall Plan. A more logical conclusion would be 
that the Marshall Plan may not have been Europe's salvation, but neither 
was it useless. 
When political economists today consider the feasibility of a 
'Marshall Plan II' for the nations of Eastern Europe, they would be well 
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advised to consider the implications of the first one. At the end of the day, 
the socio-political framework established through, and sometimes 
independent of corporative collaboration, appears to have had a more 
lasting effect upon economic transformation in Europe than any amount of 
short-term monetary assistance-public or private. 
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II. Total Private U.S. Foreign Lending56 
DLT OLT ST UT 

1947 546 36 137 497 
1948 486 47 78 470 
1949 468 57 -133 377 
1950 424 338 102 310 
1951 311 268 63 258 
1952 537 135 59 279 
1953 469 -118 -107 321 
1954 425 204 404 121 
1955 523 153 121 290 
55 B.R. Mitchell, European Historical Statistics 1750-1970 (London: 

MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1975), pp. 785-795. All figures are in constant prices 

with base years in brackets and represent millions of francs, 





56 Eichengreen, p. 244. All figures are in millions of current dollars at 

1919-28 prices as he had also included lending statistics during the post 

World War I decade. DL T is direct long term lending, OL T is other long term 

lending, SL T is short term lending, and UT is unilateral transfers. 

III. Value of U.S. Direct Investment by Area57 
Canada Latin America Western Europe 
1950 3579 4735 1720 
1951 3972 5176 1979 
1952 4593 5758 2146 
1953 5242 6034 2369 
1954 5871 6244 2369 
1955 6494 6608 3004 
1956 7460 7459 3520 
1957 8332 8805 3393 
IV. Deposits in Savings Banks58 



































57 United States Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United 

States, Colonial Times to 1957, Washington, D.C. (1960), pp. 564-566. All 

figures in millions of constant dollars. 

58 Mitchell, pp. 693-695. (a) is private savings, (b) National Savings Bank, 

(c) Post Office Savings Bank, (d) trustee savings banks, (e) all savings. All 
figures are in thousand million francs, million pounds, and million 
deutschmarks, respectively. 
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